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Ambition Theory and Presidential Aspirations: 
How the Senators Vote* 
SAMUEL J. PERNACCIARO 
University of Wisconsin-Parkside 
and 
JACK R. VAN DER SLIK 
Southern Illinois University-Carbondale 
"Ambition lies at the heart of politics ," says Joseph A. Schlesinger 1 as he 
begins to describe his ambition theory of politics. His central assumption is 
that a politician 's behavior is a complex of responses to his office goals. The 
politician's choices and decisions are made to enhance his chances to fulfill his 
office ambitions. If he wants to seek advancement in elective office "he must 
act today in terms of the electorate of the office which he hopes to win 
tomorrow . "2 We will not try to explain why politicians seek advancement. 
Schlesinger says, "The small band of governors in sizeable and competitive 
states and the conspicuous members of the Senate who together compose the 
presidential 'hopefuls' are hopeful as much because of the expectations of 
others as because of their own. "3 
The dust of electoral conflict had barely settled after the 1968 election 
when speculation began about who would be the Democratic presidential 
nominee in 1972. Despite the apparent availability and popularity of Edward 
Kennedy, the possibility of a relatively open contest for the Democratic 
nomination unconstrained by a Democrat in the White House was apparent to 
all. For most aspirants the chance to have a "good shot" at the presidency is 
likely to be small. This is particularly true for an aspirant in the majority party 
because an incumbent president may control the nomination of his successor, 
or it may pass through succession to the Vice President. Humphrey 's defeat in 
1968 could not help but whet the appetites of numerous Democrats for the 
highest political office in the land. 
The institutional base for many presidential hopefuls in 1969 was the 
United States Senate. All presidential nominees of the 1960's had previously 
been Senators. The Senate obviously provides a potential candidate a forum 
for addressing the public , for proposing policy alternatives, and for keeping in 
•we wish to thank Char les 0. Jones, Eric M. Uslander, and James W. Lindeen for their 
constructive remarks on an earlier version of this paper. 
1Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago : Rand Mc ally and 
Company, 1966), p. 1. For the implications of candidates' ambitions on party organization , see 
Schlesinger , "Po litical Party Organization," in James G. March (ed.) , Handbook of Organizations 
(Chicago: Rand Mc ally and Company , 1965), pp. 764-801. 
2Schlesinger, ibid ., p. 6. 
3Ibid. 
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constant touch with the issues of the day. It also gives Senators ample 
opportunity to accommodate their senatorial behavior to their presidential 
ambitions. They can do this in a variety of ways: by public statements , bill 
introductions , investigative activities , challenging the President's nominees 
to the courts and administrative positions, and the like. One kind of behavior 
particularly amenable to comparative analysis is their roll call voting records. 
This is the data base to which we will direct our attention . 
The matter of identifying Senators ' ambitions for the Presidency is one of 
some difficulty . Perhaps it is true , as former Senator Everett Dirksen once 
noted on a TV talk show , that every Senator at one time or another harbors the 
notion that he or she could achieve the top political prize. Arbitrarily we have 
chosen to identify as our pool of aspirants the Senators of the 91st Congress 
(1969-70) who made conspicuous steps toward obtaining that nomination ; 
namely , McGovern , Muskie , Kennedy , Hartke , Bayh, Jackson, McCarthy , 
Harris and Hughes. These put themselves forward , responded coyly to in-
quiries about their interest in the office, and, in some instances, formally 
declared for the Presidency . These we submit , can be expected to have 
accommodated their behavior , and , in particular, their roll call voting to the 
scrutiny of a national constituency during their concurrent service in the 91st 
Congress . It remains true , of course , that other Democratic hopefuls may 
similarly have adapted their voting to the same end but when opportunity 
came , they did not put themselves forward. On the other hand, the openness 
of the Democratic scramble and the array of men actually considered as active 
aspirants leads us to think that such serreptitious aspirants can be safely 
discounted . 
Drawing upon Schlesinger's ambition theory, we expect that the Senators 
who are presidential aspirants will distinguish themselves from their col-
leagues who are content to serve their states and constituents on a continuing 
basis. The aspirants will have to look and act presidential. Some of this may 
seem only to be vain posturing, the kind of puffery that critics of the American 
political style righteously protest. 4 More than that, the aspirants must obtain 
the hue of a national figure , above the parochial identifications of a state or 
particular region . Interestingly , however, the aspirants will not be particu-
larly different from one another on the issues. Particularly on the general 
issues of governmental management, social welfare, civil liberties and rights 
the candidates all seek moderate ground in the liberal-labor, northern urban 
majority of the Democratic Party. Differences from one another will basically 
be in style and rhetoric , not substance. 
On the other hand, nonaspirants will vary from one another. Their future 
constituency remains their states. Although , as Matthews pointed out , 
4 For example, see Michael Parenti , Democracy for the Few (New York: St. Martin 's Press , 
1974), pp . 141-155 and passim . 
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Senators have some discretion in defining the constituency they will serve, 
constituency characteristics are associated with senatorial voting. 5 Men who 
wish to remain in the Senate will have particularistic concerns about federal 
assistance programs , school desegregation plans , tax credits for certain indus-
tries , agricultural support level , and the like . Presidential aspirants will be 
anticipating the same national constituency. They will respond to and vote for 
the policy proposals in relation to preferences in their national political party 
of the electorate at large. We do not expect candidates to distinguish them-
selves from one another sharply. It is unlikely that an aspirant will be nomi-
nated because of his record on the issues - the issue alone are not of first 
importance - rather , one may be disqualified for having an "unacceptable" 
record on one or more salient national issues. 
Our hypothesis can be disconfirmed by two kinds of senatorial voting 
behavior . Aspirants may not vote similarly on particular issue positions. They 
may choose contrasting positions because they act out of different perceptions 
of what is right , popular , workable or reasonable. Perhaps the aspirants do not 
feel constrained to behave similarly in anticipation of the national consti-
tuency. Such a finding would suggest that candidates perceive the electorate 
and/or their party 's supporters as a diverse constituency for which numerous 
viable trategies might be devised to put together a winning coalition. Candi-
dates would then be likely to communicate sp cific appeals for support to 
distinct interests- Southerners, blacks , labor, youth, the doves , and the like. 
Substantial disagreement among the candidates on the dimensions of policy 
would disconfirm our hypothesis . 
The hypothesis would be disconfirmed if all Democratic Senators vote 
similarly. If there is little variance among aspirants, but likewi e little among 
nonaspirants , our theory is meaningless. However , party unity is hardly a 
hallmark of Senate Democrats . 6 It is true , of course, that much of the disunity 
in the voting of Senate Democrats reflects the traditional cleavage between 
the South and the rest of the country's Democrats. For ambition theory to be 
at all persuasive we need to show that the aspirants, who are all non-southern 
Democrats, vote more homogeneously than their nonaspirant colleagues from 
outside the South . 7 
Having noted the Democrats' regional cleavage , it is worth suggesting that 
ambition theory has some explanatory and possibly predictive relevance to the 
voting of Southern members of Congress. George C. Wallac not withstand-
5Donald R. Matthews , U.S. Senators and Their World ( ew York: Random House , 1960), 
pp. 230-239. Clausen , with greater precision , indicates that constituency is more ignificant than 
party on senatorial voting on civil liberties and interna tional involvement issues. See Aage R. 
Clausen, How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus ( ew York: St. Martin 's Press , 1974), pp . 
140-149 . 
6See, for example , David B. Truman , The Congressional Party : A Case Study ( ew York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1959), especially Pf · 51-63. 
7See Malcolm E. Jewe ll and Samue C. Patter son, The Legislative Process in the United 
States , 2d ed . ( ew York: Random Hou se, 1973), pp. 454-455 . 
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ing, Southern politicians have had little realistic basis for pursuing presiden-
tial aspirations in the Democratic party . Most political commentators would 
agree that , except for their loyalty to traditional, southern lifestyle and values, 
Senators such as Russell of Georgia and Fulbright of Arkansas would have 
been considered promising presidential timber . Because they maintained 
positions on race related issues which were at variance with what was accepta-
ble to the national constituency, especially the national Democratic consti-
tuency , efforts to pursue such aspirations were bound to fail. Of course, 
southern Democratic Senators have been shown to be "different " on issues 
besides race related ones, 8 but chances are that their issue positions would 
have been more tractable if the presidency constituted a real career opportun-
ity . Because the presidency is not available, southern Democrats can be 
conservative or moderate on many social reform issues or exact a price from 
the party or President who needs their vote - military bases , defense 
contracts, agricultural subsidies, favorable consideration on bureaucratic de-
cisions affecting local interests , pork, and other tangible benefits. Until there 
is a convergence of values between the North and South on attitudes toward 
race, or until the salience of this issue recedes , or until a southern aspirant 
forswears traditional racial values of his region , a Southerner cannot be a 
viable presidential candidate. In the absence of this office opportunity, presi-
dential ambitions will not constrain southern Democratic Senators to accom-
modate themselves to national values and interests . 
Our theory does not insist that aspirants must necessarily change their 
views on issues . It may be that their issue positions have been both consistent 
over time , and apt for a presidential candidacy. It does suggest that change 
might occur in some aspirants. Our empirical tests make no attempt to detect 
change over time. If the results of this study are persuasive , a longitudinal 
inquiry into senatorial voting behavior to ascertain change over time might be 
in order. It may well be that the decision to seek the presidency is the 
watershed for new voting patt erns . This question goes beyond the scope of the 
inquiry which follows. 
METHODS OF INQUIRY 
The data base for our inquiry consists of 40 cumulative scales or dimensions 
of Senate voting in the 91st Congress (1969-70). Beginning with 666 roll call 
votes, we eliminated 162 in which the minority did not exceed ten percent of 
those voting on roll call. Using techniques suggested by MacRae, we mad e 
pairwise comparisons of each roll call with every other as measured with Yules 
8H . Douglas Price, "Are Southern Democrats Differen t? An Application of Scale Analysis to 
Senate Voting Patterns, " in Nelson W. Polsby , Robert A. Dent ler and Paul A. Smith (eds. ), 
Politics and Social Life (Boston : Houghton -M illin Company , 1963), pp. 740-756. 
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Q coefficient. 9 We defined clusters of four or more roll calls in which each roll 
call included was related to every other with a coefficient ;;e,:±.8.10 We 
identified 40 clusters encompassing 408 roll calls, leaving 96 roll calls unclus-
tered . The roll calls in each cluster were organized into cumulative scales and 
Senators wer e assigned scale scores on each dimension of voting. 
The scaling technique is objective, but identifying the content of the scales 
is not . Inst ead of a prior prediction of relationships among issues being tested , 
we must account for roll calls that are empirically related. The labels and 
desc riptions of the dimensions are based upon our interpretations of the 
public descriptions of the roll calls, especially those contained in the Congres-
sio nal Quart erly and the Con gress ional Reco rd , and occasionally 
supplemented by information and interpr etations in news periodicals. 11 We 
note with caution the fact that the dimensions themselves are in some in-
stances highly related and that the distinctions between th em can be fine or 
ambiguou . Howev er, each dimension constitutes a unique distribution of 
scale scores for the memb er of the Senat e. 
Although all members of the Senate were assigned scores, our interest 
centers upon the scores for Democrats . For purposes of our exploration the 
measur es are treated as if they are interval scales of measurement . Our 
primary interest is in whether or not there is more homogeneity in the voting 
of the aspirant Senators than those who are not aspirants. Statistically then we 
simply want to compare the variance of the voting scores of the two groups. 
Previous resea rch suggests that comparisons be made to "All Democrats" and 
nonsouthern Democrats. f! ecause our aspirant group is relatively small we 
will examine individual scores to indicate whether or not particular aspirants 
were deviating from the aspirant group means . Finally , because our scores 
measure dir ection of voting we will also compare the mean scores of the 
groups of Senators..J 
FINDI GS 
The data in Table 1 indicat e that on most of the dimensions of voting there 
is sub tantially more homog eneity in the scores of the presidential aspirant 
Senators than in those of the nonaspirant Senators . A comparision of aspirants 
with all nonaspirants shows that on 37 of 40 dimensions the coefficients of 
variance for aspirants are smaller than those of th eir counterparts. Even when 
9 Duncan MacRae, Jr . , "A Method for Identifying Issues and Fact ions from Legislative 
Votes," American Political cience Review 59, o. 4 (Dece mber 1965), 909-926. The trea tment of 
issues is elabora ted in chapt ers 2 and 3 of MacRae's Issues and Parties in Le[!,islative Voting: 
Methods of Statistical Analysis (New York: Harper and Row, Publi hers , 1970). 
1
°1'his thr eshold leve l of .80 sets a minimum Q value which eliminat es roll calls from the 
cluster which are only minim ally related to the other roll calls in the cluster. Additionall y, the .80 
minimum Q value produced Guttman scales with littl e error and is compar able to the req uire-
ment of .90+ leve l of rep rodu cib ility. See Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watt s, Jr . and Allen R. 
Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston : Northw estern University Press , 1966), p. 103. 
''Coefficients of reproducibility and a description of the issues in the dim ens ions are 
reported in Appendix A. 
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aspirants are compared only with their nonsouthern counterparts their voting 
is more homogeneous on 33 of 40 voting dimensions. 
One way of comparing the variance in scale scores of the groups is to report 
the ratio between the variance of nonaspirants and that of aspirants for each 
scale. On scale 1, for example, the variance for all nonaspirants is 44.02 
compared to 0.69 for aspirants . The ratio exceeds 63 to l. Comparing nonas-
pirants outside the South (variance = 9. 76) with the apsirants yields a ration 
exceeding 14 to l. Table 2 reports four categories of ratios. For category A 
ratios equal or exceed 10 to l. In B the ratio equals or exceeds 2 to l but is less 
than 10 to l. In C the ratio equals or exceeds l to l but is less than 2 to l. In 
category D variance for the aspirants exceeds that for the nonaspirant group. 
From Table 2 it is apparent that , as anticipated, the contrast in 
homogeneity of voting is sharper when all nonaspirant Senators are compared 
to the aspirants than when the comparison is between nonaspirants outside 
the South and the aspirants. Half the dimensions in category A for all nonas-
pirants appear in B for nonaspirants outside the South. Six dimensions in 
category B for all nonaspirants appear in C for nonaspirants outside the South. 
The results are similar for all categories. Referring back to Table 1, the reader 
can find that variances in column 4 exceed those in column 7 for all but nine 
dimensions and that in all of the nine the differences are modest. 
There is remarkably little variance in the voting distributions of the 
aspirants on the 40 policy dimensions . On only five dimensions does the 
variance coefficient for the presidential candidates exceed 3. 00. The variance 
is highest on dimension 11, the Anti-military Expansionism scale. Eight of the 
nine aspirants ' scores are between 8.5 and 10.0, showing them to be oppo-
nents of military expansion. Senator Jackson, however , is sharply distingished 
from the others with a score of 0. 0, showing strong support for the military. 
Second most variance occurs on dimension 18, Taxpayers Savings and Con-
gressional Budget Austerity. Votes in the dimension were to cut NASA 
spending , tighten spending and audit controls on defense contracts and 
reduce the total spending authorization for the Defense Department for fiscal 
year 1971. Seven of the eight Senators scored supported austerity with scores 
of six, seven or eight . Senator Jackson's score was one. Dimension 27 is called 
Tax Reform #2 and includes roll calls on amendments and passage of the Tax 
Geform Act ofl969 . Most Senators supported reform with scores between 5.0 
and 7.0 , but McCarthy and Hartke had scores of2.0. On dimension 32, Tax 
Subsidy Reform , the issues concerned reform of mineral depletion allowances 
and reduction of the maximum receivable by farmers for farm subsidies. High 
scorers favored subsidy reductions and low scorers opposed. The candidates 
were spread on this dimension ; Harris had the lowest score of0.0 , Hartke and 
McCarthy had 1.0, McGovern and Muskie registered 3.0 and Hughes and 
Bayh wer e the strongest opponents of subsidies and depletion allowances with 
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TABLE 1. Means and Variances of Three Sets of Democratic Senators on the 40 Dimensions 
Scale NONASPIRANTS ASPIRANTS 
Score All Non South ern 
Rang e Mean Varian ce Mean Varian ce Mean Varianc e 
Scale 0- N Sco,-e S2 N Scorn S2 N Score S2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
1 17 47 10.51 44.02 31 14.79 9.76 9 16.50 0.69 
2 20 48 15.39 13.95 32 17.47 5.11 9 18.78 1.63 
3 21 48 12.625 73.52 32 17.38 27.68 9 20.06 2.72 
4 7 42 2.94 6.66 28 3.93 6.16 7 5.86 3.14 
5 10 43 6.26 12.54 29 8.48 1.42 8 9.50 0.36 
6 16 45 12.17 15.18 30 14.28 4.17 8 15.56 0.53 
7 11 46 7.50 12.19 30 9.52 2.35 9 10.39 0.61 
8 11 44 5.32 17.06 28 7.64 10.72 9 10.17 1.56 
9 8 40 6.68 1.51 25 7.10 0.90 6 7.42 0.44 
10 4 31 2.50 1.35 17 2.09 1.82 6 1.50 1.00 
11 10 45 5.73 11.73 30 7.07 9.44 9 8.50 10.50 
12 9 47 4.98 8.68 31 3.10 2.44 9 1.89 2.36 
13 11 46 1.89 3.79 31 1.07 0.96 9 1.17 0.88 
14 6 38 2.45 3.34 25 3.20 3.10 4 4.00 2.67 
15 6 41 5.06 0.58 27 4.96 0.71 8 5.44 0.17 
16 7 45 2.98 6.69 30 3.55 7.06 9 5 .89 1.05 
17 7 46 4.66 6.31 31 6.02 1.41 8 6.06 0.89 
18 8 33 3.74 10.27 20 5.05 8.37 8 6.75 5.93 
19 4 37 2.27 1.77 24 2.81 1.43 7 3.21 0.41 
20 4 38 1.99 1.22 26 2.42 0.67 7 3.14 0.81 
21 5 48 3.60 2.33 32 4.38 0.61 9 4.61 0.49 
22 4 33 2.11 1.62 20 1.73 1.88 3 1.00 1.00 
23 6 43 1.38 2.02 29 0.78 0.73 9 0.33 0.25 
24 5 43 2.98 3.13 28 2.18 2.62 8 0.75 0 .71 
25 9 43 4.97 9.42 29 3 .31 4.62 6 1.08 1.64 
26 6 44 3.16 2.74 29 3 .88 2.17 8 4.94 1.03 
27 7 43 4.36 4.65 29 5.24 2.32 9 5.39 4.24 
28 5 36 4.22 0.84 21 4.24 0.72 6 4.50 0.70 
29 5 41 2.10 3.19 28 1.30 1.60 8 0.63 1.13 
30 5 44 3.24 2.69 29 3 .57 2.53 6 4.83 0.17 
31 4 41 1.28 0.88 26 1.33 1.20 6 1.42 0.64 
32 9 39 2.18 4.02 23 2.78 4.75 7 2.57 3.95 
33 4 41 1.33 1. 73 28 1.71 1.77 8 1.50 1. 71 
34 4 41 0.55 1.29 27 o·.10 1.58 7 1.50 2.58 
35 4 34 1.77 2.94 20 2.60 2.41 5 3.70 0.20 
36 4 34 1.47 1.00 21 1.79 1.19 5 2.20 1.33 
37 3 42 1.83 0.87 26 1.54 0.89 7 1.00 1.00 
38 4 30 2.07 1.69 19 1.74 1.40 4 2.00 1.17 
39 4 26 2.80 2.22 15 1.93 2.03 5 0.50 0.75 
40 3 39 2.49 0.97 27 2.72 0.64 5 2.60 0.80 
TABLE 2. Comparison of Variance 
Rati o of Non Aspirant Varian ce to Varian ce f or Aspirant s 
ALL NON SOUTH 
Rati o Scale Numb ers Scale Numb ers 
A 10- 1+ 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 30, 35 1, 3, 30, 35 
B< l0 - 1 2, 4, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 
;a, 1- 1 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 39 
26, 29, 39 
C< 2- l 10, 11, 14, 18, 20, 22, 4, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 
;a,,1- 1 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 38, 21, 22, 28, 29, 31, 32, 
40 33, 38 
D > l-1 34, 36, 37 11, 20, 27, 34, 36, 37, 40 
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scores of 5.0 . Finally , Dimension 4, Federal Spending #1 , was concerned 
with salaries for political officials in all three branches, increases in spending 
for international development and also domestic programs including mass 
transit , medicare and welfare. Six Senators had scores of6.0 and 7.0, McCar-
thy and Muskie were not scored , but Hartke gave least support for increased 
spending with a score of 2. 0. 
Summarizing then , Jackson contrasted with the other aspirants on support 
for defense , space and military. Hartke and McCarthy did not support tax 
reform , Harris joining them specifically on subsidy and depletion reforms. 
Hartke also opposed increased federal spending . These deviations noted , the 
aspirant Senators voted with substantial similarity . 
Our theory offers no basis for predicting what direction aspirants will take 
on the issues in comparison with other Senators. Inspection of the mean scale 
scores for the three groups of Senators , all nonaspirants , nonaspirants outside 
the South , and aspirants , does indicate order in the responses . The most 
common pattern is the one that occurs on Dimension 1, States Rights . The 
mean for all nonaspirants is 10.51 , the lowest mean reported on that dimen-
sion. Nonaspirants from outside the South have a mean score of 14. 79. The 
mean for the aspirants is highest at 16.50. While the scores and the closeness 
of the means vary from scale to scale , the order of the means for each of the 
three groups is in this pattern on 25 of the 40 scales . The opposite pattern 
describes nine of the 40 scales. For example , on Dimension 10, Financial 
Conservatism , aspirants are the least conservative and have the lowest mean 
score with 1.50. All nonaspirants have the highest mean score with 2.50 , and 
the man for aspirants from outside the South falls between those of the other 
groups with 2. 09. On the remaining six dimensions the order of the category 
means is irregular . 
DISCUSSION 
We hypothesized that the aspirations of Democratic Senators , desirous of 
the Presidency , would be reflected in their legislative voting. We expected 
that the single national constituency would attract candidates with similar 
policy positions to seek the presidency. Nonaspirants, on the other hand, 
presumably would be voting in behalf of more parochial interests; responding 
to regional , state or substate demands , specific groups or their personal 
values. There would be more variance in their scale scores . The findings fit the 
theory fairly well. 
On most of the issue dimensions , aspirants voted more similarly on the 
issues than nonaspirants, even when Southern Senators are excluded from the 
comparison. Referring back to Table 2, we note that the ratios comparing 
variance for these two sets of Senators are highest on Dimensions 1, 3, 30 and 
35. These were certainly among the very controversial issues of the day. 
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Twenty of the roll calls in Dimension 1 dealt with school integration and 
bussing . Others dealt with direct election of the president and changing the 
filibuster rule . Implicit in these issues is the struggle for nationalizing Ameri -
can politics at the expense of states rights . Clearly the Democrats choosing a 
presidential nominee had little choice among the aspirants from the Senate . 
The aspirants' mean score on the dimension was nearly the maximum possi-
ble , clearly favoring nationalization. 
Dimension 3, the Humanitarian Dimension includes measures placing 
high value on human dignity in and out of the United States - nonprolifica -
tion treaty , Youth Corps , restricting deployment of ABM's, providing a 
federal legal service program , improving school lunch food services. Many of 
these proposals were opposed by President Nixon, and there was substantial 
variance in Democrat voting, but the candidates were very similar and consis-
tently for extending human dignity , as our dimension measures it. Despite the 
fact that these roll calls constitute a significant dimension of conflict among 
fellow partisans , there was not much choice among the candidates' positions 
on this dimension . The same point can be made about the Drug Control 
Dimension (#30). All the aspirants were high scorers on the dimensions 
favoring the removal of"no knock " warrants from the Dangerous Substances 
Act, limiting the Attorney General's authority relative to enforcement and 
easing penalties from marijuana enforcement. On Dimension 35, ational 
Expenditures, the aspirants favored increased federal spending for urban 
problems in Washington , D.C ., but less for foreign aid than recommended by 
the administration - in short, supporting a change in priorities by spending 
more on domestic problems and less on foreign aid . 
Without a belabored discussion of more dimensions, th e point here is to 
suggest that the development of consensus on the issues, often described as a 
function carried out by the political party, 12 is on many substantive issues 
largely anticipated by the aspirants. It remains true , of course, that differences 
of style and emphasis may emerge in the campaign which are not 
foreshadowed in the policy dimensions of Senate voting. Likewise , similar 
candidates may encourage divergent types (such as Wallace ) to enter the fray. 
Looking at our data what impresses us about the aspirants from the Senate is 
their similarity on the dimensions rather than their differences. As explained 
above , the most "different" of the aspirants was Senator Jackson , who was 
widely and correctly regarded as more hawkish than the others. The major 
contenders, Kennedy , Muskie and McGovern , and two darkhorses , Bayh and 
Hughes , voted nearly alike on almost all the dimensions of Senate voting. 13 
12 Marion D . Irish and James W. Prothro , The Politics of American Democracy, 5th ed. 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall , 1971). "Looking first at latent functions of national conventions 
for the parties themselves, the most important is the creation or ratification of party consensus." 
p. 313. 
13Our responde nts are a universe of Democ ratic Senators for a given time and we have 
catego rized them into groups. Statistics for evaluating differences betwee n samples have no 
application her e. To satisfy our own curiosity, however, we compa red the means of non-south em 
aspirants and non-aspirants with an F tes t, finding the differences significant at the . 05 level on 
scales 5, 8, 12, 16, 24, 25, and 39. 
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Comparison of the mean scale scores for each category of Senators indi-
cates that the aspirant group mean is only occasionally between the mean 
score for all nonaspirant Democrats and the mean for nonaspirants from 
outside the South . Aspirant scores are either high or low on 35 of the 40 scales. 
In several instances , the differ ences are substantial. The scales on which 
mean differences were substantial are scales which contain two kinds of issues 
-civil rights and tax reform. Let us quickly say that the differences occur only 
on seven scales and that more dimensions have civil rights and tax reform roll 
calls than these seven. Yet it is noteworthy that the aspirants exceed the 
support of their non-southern collegaues on these issues . The aspirants 
tended to be out in front of their party in their voting to equalize oppor-
tunities . On economic dimensions they sought to close tax loopholes and 
provide family assistance. In a voter appeal sense, the aspirants were nearly 
uniformly liberal , responding to or anticipating the interests of racial 
minorities and the poor. 
On only five scales could the aspirants' mean scores be thought of as 
expressing a mediating position between the scores for southerners and 
non-southerns ( # 12, 32, 33, 38, and 40). In each instance, the means were 
similar among all three groups. None constituted a matter of conspicuous 
regional cleavage within the party. Despite the order of means, there is 
nothing about the issues to suggest that the aspirants in fact played or attemp-
ted to achieve for themselves a position between the southern and non-
southern Senators. 
No aspirant consistently distinguished his position from the others in a 
direction attractive to the South. Jackson 's voting on military spending was 
like that of a number of southern Senators , but obviously he was more liberal 
than Southerners on matters of social welfare, civil rights and tax issues. On a 
range of issues, Hartke was more moderate than the other aspirants, but 
evidenced no particular "Southern strategy" on his overall voting record . 
McCarthy (who could not be placed on several dimensions because of non-
participations ) was not as liberal as most aspirants on tax reform , but his 
positions on most issues would not be attractive to the South. 
Aspirants ' scale scores indicate no subtle or varying strategies by individu-
als to appeal to a unique coalition of interests to advance to the presidency. 
Instead it would appear that most placed themselves on the is ues in a way that 
would be generally acceptable to the presidential wing of the Democratic 
Party .14 Shades of distinction between the candidates were created more by 
the styles of their campaigns than their voting records. If McGovern was more 
attractive to the young than Muskie, it was not because of differences in their 
Senate voting. We think ambitions for the Presidency help explain the similar-
14See James MacGregor Burns , The Deadloc k of Democrac y: Four-Party Politics in America 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall , Inc ., 1963, 1967), especially pp. 249-264. 
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ity of candidates ' voting. It implies that they seek to satisfy or reflect a 
consensus perceived in the national electorate or their own party . The de-
velopment of such a consensus and how aspirants read it go beyond the limits 
of our inquiry . 
PREDICTIO S: COi G BEYOND OUR DATA 
At this writing, nominations for President for 1976 have not been settled . 
Obviously , however , presidential aspirants from the Senate have fared badly 
in the proceedings . In the denouements of Agnew and Nixon, the previously 
untried vice presidential appointment process brought a U.S. House member 
to the presidency. The candidacies of others whose careers did not include 
national offices proved to be robust. The most consistent losers were Senate 
aspirants. Kennedy refused to run , and one by one Senators and former 
Senators fell by the wayside: Mondale , Muskie , Bayh, Bentson , Harris, 
Jackson , and Humphrey. Senator Church remains a darkhorse possibility , 
along with U.S. House aspirant Morris Udall. o Republican challenger arose 
from the Senate. 
Although it is possible that the public mood that nourished the campaigns 
of Carter , Reagan and Brown may persist , and that their very success will 
stimulate ambitions and support for candidacies by more governors , we 
expect the Senate to be the most fertile soil for nurturing the aspirations of 
future presidential candidates. Moreover , the impressive support achieved 
by Jimmy Carter on a nationwide basis confirms our view that Southern 
aspirants can be viable presidential candidates when they disclaim the tradi-
tional Southern racial values. We think this aspect of Carter's campaign is of 
greater future significance than the fact that he is not a Senator. Senators, 
including those from the Soqth , can be viable presidential aspirants , espe-
cially in the Democratic party . We expect them to be Senators who have voted 
for nationalizing public policy rather than for defending states ' rights, for 
spending relatively more on domestic social problems than on foreign aid or 
military budgets , and for extending civil rights and equalizing economic 
opportunities for minorities and the poor . Chances are we have not seen the 
withering away of presidential aspirations among Senators such as Bayh , 
Church and Kennedy. Meanwhile others , including Stevenson, Tunney , 
Bumpers and Chiles, will not lightly foreswear candidacies because of the 
events that shaped the presidential campaign of 1976. 
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APPENDIX A. The Forty Scalable Clusters 
COEFFICIENT of NO . OF 
NAME REPRODUCIBILITY 
ISSUES 
l. States Rights .972 34 Senate Rule 22, Direct 
election of President , 
civil rights , equal 
rights , busing, etc . 
2. Partisan Dimension .972 39 Political contribution 
tax credit, equal time 
provision , fixing 
amount of money spent 
in electronic media in 
elections , minimum 5% 
income tax, etc . 
3. Humanitarian Dimension .966 41 Nonproliferation treaty , 
ABM , Vietnam Policy, 
Youth Corp , Federal legal 
services, School Lunch 
Program, etc . 
4. Federal Spending #1 .971 9 Increase salaries for 3 
branches of government, 
money for mass transit , 
medicaid and welfare 
spending , etc . 
5. Equal Rights .969 14 Voting rights , manpower 
training , equal 
opportunities , etc . 
6. Economic & Welfare Spending .964 22 Hill-Burton prof;:am , 
urban renewal , ead Start , 
Social Security , HEW health 
programs , etc . 
7. Human Rights .967 24 Food stamps , OEO , local 
initiative program , child 
nutrition program, etc. 
8. Equal Rights or Equal .963 17 Philadelphia Plan , OEO 
Opportunities appropriations , child 
Nutrition Act, etc. 
9. Federal Spending #2 .969 9 Urban renewal funds , 
health research 
spending , cost of John J . 
Kennedy Center, etc. 
10. Financial Conservatism .977 4 Neighborhood Youth Corp. , 
Social Security , UN 
building , etc. 
11. Anti-Military Expansionism .968 16 Military spending and 
assistance, Cooper-
Church Amendment , use of 
herbicides in Vietnam, 
etc. 
12. Civil Rights .972 11 Voting rights , nomina-
tion of Haynesworth , 
Philadelphia Plan , School 
desegregation , etc . 
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13. Domestic Problems # l .962 16 Consumer protection , 
postal reorganization , 
unemployment and man-
power training , drug 
abu e , etc . 
14. ational ecurity .976 6 Troop levels in Vietnam, 
military purchases , 
national security 
requirements, etc . 
15. Dome tic Problems #2 .965 6 Social Security Bene-
fits, surtax extension , 
highway safety , etc. 
16. Tax Reform .955 Oil depletion allowance , 
minimum income tax, 
funding SST, etc. 
17. ational ecurity Spending .967 10 Military procurement , 
Cooper-Church Amend-
ment , etc . 
18. Taxpayers Savings or Con- .950 10 ASA Budg t, space 
gressional Budget Austerity shuttle , military 
assistanc e, defense 
spending , etc . 
19. Federal Salaries .991 4 Salaries of federal 
employe es and Vi e 
President and certain 
members of Congress . 
20. Human eeds .980 4 OEO programs , elect 
Committee on utrition , 
etc. 
21. Contemporary Reform .979 6 Oil depletion , taxes , 
Social Security benefits , 
etc . 
22. Protectionism .970 5 Civil service, import 
restrictions , etc . 
23. Reform #1 .956 6 Drug control , ecology, 
etc. 
24. Reform #2 .973 6 Taxes , Family Assist-
ance Plan , gun control , 
etc . 
25. Civil Right .945 9 Equal employment 
op61rtunities , "Phila-de phia Plan ," 
desegregation of 
chools , etc. 
26. Mass Society Problems .958 Ecology, drug control , 
retirement benefits , 
etc. 
27. Tax Reform #2 .954 7 Investment credit , tax 
loopholes, etc . 
28. Public Health Problem .970 5 Grants to medical 
schools , drug control, 
etc . 
29. "Status Quo " .962 5 Agricultural Price 
Supports , taxes , 
Vietnam war , etc . 
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30. Drug Control .948 5 "Dangerous drugs ," 
"no-knock " warrants , 
etc . 
31. Public Reform .990 4 Agricultural policy , 
taices on cooperatives , 
Indian lands , etc. 
32. Taic Subsidy Reform .973 5 Oil , fas, recious (gas & minerals ) meta , an mineral 
depletion allowance , 
etc . 
33. Federal Spending & .983 4 Appropriations , funding 
Retirement SST, and retirement 
for judges , etc . 
34. Competitive Navy Repair .988 5 Navy ship repair 
Contracts contracts . 
35. National Ex~nditures .959 4 Money for foreign aid 
(Foreign Ai & D.C .) and for D .C. 
36. Rights and Privileges .980 4 Protection of rights 
and privileges. 
37. Newspaper Preservation .988 4 Preservation of news-
papers and anti-trust 
laws. 
38. Reorganization Reform .993 4 Postal reform , Con-
gressional committee 
reform , etc . 
39. Minority Rights .965 4 Voting rights , unem-
rcioyment compensation 
or migrant workers, 
etc. 
40. Worker's Problems .970 4 Railway strike , 
safety, etc . 
mine 
